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Security & Compliance

Gap Analysis
CISA Baseline

Safeguarding your organization’s data, infrastructure, and users.

Gap Analysis

Microsoft Teams

Microsoft 365 (M365) Teams is a cloud-based text and live chat workspace that supports video calls, chat messaging, screen sharing, and file sharing. This secure configuration baseline provides specific policies to strengthen Microsoft Teams’ security.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides guidance and capabilities to secure federal civilian executive branch agencies’ cloud business application environments and protect federal information that is created, accessed, shared, and stored in those environments.

Assumptions

 

The License Requirements sections of this document assume the organization is using an M365 E3 license level at a minimum. Therefore, only licenses not included in E3/ are listed.

Key Terminology

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

Access to Teams can be controlled by the user type. In this baseline, the types of users are defined as follows:

  1. Internal users: Members of the agency’s M365 tenant.

  2. External users: Members of a different M365 tenant.

  3. Business to Business (B2B) guest users: External users who are formally invited to collaborate with the team and added to the agency’s Microsoft Entra as guest users. These users authenticate with their home organization/tenant and are granted access to the team by virtue of being listed as guest users on the tenant’s Microsoft Entra.

  4. Unmanaged users: Users who are not members of any M365 tenant or organization (e.g., personal Microsoft accounts).

  5. Anonymous users: Teams users joining calls who are not authenticated through the agency’s tenant; these users include unmanaged users, external users (except for B2B guests), and true anonymous users (i.e., users who are not logged in to any Microsoft or organization account, such as dial-in users1).

Security Solutions

1. Meeting Policies

This section helps reduce security risks posed by the external participants during meetings. In this instance, the term “external participants” includes external users, B2B guest users, unmanaged users, and anonymous users.

This section helps reduce security risks related to the user permissions for recording Teams meetings and events. These policies and user permissions apply to meetings hosted by a user, as well as during one-on-one calls and group calls started by a user. Agencies should comply with any other applicable policies or legislation in addition to this guidance.

Policies

 

MS.TEAMS.1.1v1 – External meeting participants SHOULD NOT be enabled to request control of shared desktops or windows.

  • Rationale: An external participant with control of a shared screen could potentially perform unauthorized actions on the shared screen. This policy reduces that risk by removing an external participant’s ability to request control. However, if an agency has a legitimate use case to grant this control, it may be done on a case-by-case basis.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy, as well as custom meeting policies.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
    • None

MS.TEAMS.1.2v1 – Anonymous users SHALL NOT be enabled to start meetings.

  • Rationale: For agencies that implemented custom policies providing more flexibility to some users to automatically admit “everyone” to a meeting – this policy provides protection from anonymous users starting meeting to scrape internal contacts.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy, and custom meeting policies if they exist.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

MS.TEAMS.1.3v1 – Anonymous users and dial-in callers SHOULD NOT be admitted automatically.

  • Rationale: Automatically allowing admittance to anonymous and dial-in users diminishes control of meeting participation and invites potential data breach. This policy reduces that risk by requiring all anonymous and dial-in users to wait in a lobby until admitted by an authorized meeting participant. If the agency has a use case to admit members of specific trusted organizations and/or B2B guests automatically, custom policies may be created and assigned to authorized meeting organizers.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy. Custom meeting policies MAY be created to allow specific users more flexibility. For example, B2B guest users and trusted partner members may be admitted automatically into meetings organized by authorized users.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
    • None

MS.TEAMS.1.4v1 – Internal users SHOULD be admitted automatically.

  • Rationale: Requiring internal users to wait in the lobby for explicit admission can lead to admission fatigue. This policy enables internal users to be automatically admitted to the meeting through global policy.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy. Custom meeting policies MAY be created to allow specific users more flexibility.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
    • None

MS.TEAMS.1.5v1 – Dial-in users SHOULD NOT be enabled to bypass the lobby.

  • Rationale: Automatically admitting dial-in users reduces control over who can participate in a meeting and increases potential for data breaches. This policy reduces the risk by requiring all dial-in users to wait in a lobby until they are admitted by an authorized meeting participant.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy, as well as custom meeting policies.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
    • None

MS.TEAMS.1.6v1 – Meeting recording SHOULD be disabled.

  • Rationale: Allowing any user to record a Teams meeting or group call may lead to unauthorized disclosure of shared information, including audio, video, and shared screens. By disabling the meeting recording setting in the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy, an agency limits information exposure.
  • Last modified: March 2025
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy. Custom policies MAY be created to allow more flexibility for specific users.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
    • None

MS.TEAMS.1.7v2 – Record an event SHOULD NOT be set to Always record.

  • Rationale: Allowing to always record Live Events can pose data leakage and other security risks. Limiting recording permissions to only the organizer minimizes the security risk to the organizer’s discretion for these Live Events. Administrators can also disable recording for all live events.
  • Last modified: March 2025
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) meeting policy. Custom policies MAY be created to allow more flexibility for specific users.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:
    • None

Resources

 

License Requirements

 

  • N/A

Security Solutions

2. External User Access

This section helps reduce security risks related to external and unmanaged user access. In this instance, external users refer to members of a different M365 tenant, and unmanaged users refer to users who are not members of any M365 tenant or organization.

External access allows external users to look up internal users by their email address to initiate chats and calls entirely within Teams. Blocking external access prevents external users from using Teams as an avenue for reconnaissance or phishing. Even with external access disabled, external users will still be able to join Teams calls, assuming anonymous join is enabled. Depending on agency need, if both external access and anonymous join are blocked—neither required nor recommended by this baseline—external collaborators would only be able to attend meetings if added as B2B guest users.

External access may be granted on a per-domain basis. This may be desirable in some cases (e.g., for agency-to-agency collaboration). See the Chief Information Officer Council’s Interagency Collaboration Program Office of Management and Budget MA site for a list of .gov domains for sharing.

Similar to external users, blocking contact with unmanaged Teams users prevents these users from looking up internal users by their email address and initiating chats and calls within Teams. These users would still be able to join calls, assuming anonymous join is enabled. Additionally, unmanaged users may be added to Teams chats if the internal user initiates the contact.

Policies

 

MS.TEAMS.2.1v1 – External access for users SHALL only be enabled on a per-domain basis.

  • Rationale: The default configuration allows members to communicate with all external users with similar access permissions. This unrestricted access can lead to data breaches and other security threats. This policy provides protection against threats posed by unrestricted access by allowing communication with only trusted domains.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

MS.TEAMS.2.2v1 – Unmanaged users SHALL NOT be enabled to initiate contact with internal users.

  • Rationale: Allowing contact from unmanaged users can expose users to email and contact address harvesting. This policy provides protection against this type of harvesting.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy is not applicable to Government Community Cloud (GCC), GCC High, and Department of Defense (DoD) tenants.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

MS.TEAMS.2.3v1 – Internal users SHOULD NOT be enabled to initiate contact with unmanaged users.

  • Rationale: Contact with unmanaged users can pose the risk of data leakage and other security threats. This policy provides protection by disabling internal user access to unmanaged users.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy is not applicable to Government Community Cloud (GCC), GCC High, and Department of Defense (DoD) tenants.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

Resources

 

License Requirements

 

  • N/A

Security Solutions

3. Skype Users

This section helps reduce security risks related to contact with Skype users. Microsoft is officially retiring Skype for Business Online and wants to give customers information and resources to plan and execute a successful upgrade to Teams. Below are the decommissioning dates by product:

  • Skype for Business Online: July 31, 2021
  • Skype for Business 2015: April 11, 2023
  • Skype for Business 2016: Oct. 14, 2025
  • Skype for Business 2019: Oct. 14, 2025
  • Skype for Business Server 2015: Oct. 14, 2025
  • Skype for Business Server 2019: Oct. 14, 2025
  • Skype for Business LTSC 2021: Oct. 13, 2026

Policies

 

MS.TEAMS.3.1v1 – Contact with Skype users SHALL be blocked.

  • Rationale: Microsoft is officially retiring all forms of Skype as listed above. Allowing contact with Skype users puts agency users at additional security risk. By blocking contact with Skype users an agency limits access to security threats utilizing the vulnerabilities of the Skype product.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy is not applicable to Government Community Cloud (GCC), GCC High, and Department of Defense (DoD) tenants.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

Resources

 

License Requirements

 

  • N/A

Security Solutions

4. Teams Email Integration

This section helps reduce security risks related to Teams email integration. Teams provides an optional feature allowing channels to have an email address and receive email.

Policies

 

MS.TEAMS.4.1v1 – Teams email integration SHALL be disabled.

  • Rationale: Microsoft Teams email integration associates a Microsoft, not tenant domain, email address with a Teams channel. Channel emails are addressed using the Microsoft-owned domain <teams.ms>. By disabling Teams email integration, an agency prevents potentially sensitive Teams messages from being sent through external email gateways.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: Teams email integration is not available in GCC, GCC High, or DoD regions.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

Resources

 

License Requirements

 

  • N/A

Security Solutions

5. App Management

This section helps reduce security risks related to app integration with Microsoft Teams. Teams can integrate with the following classes of apps:

  • Microsoft apps: apps published by Microsoft.

  • Third-party apps: apps not authored by Microsoft, published to the Teams store.

  • Custom apps: apps not published to the Teams store, such as apps under development, that users sideload into Teams.

Policies

 

MS.TEAMS.5.1v1 – Agencies SHOULD only allow installation of Microsoft apps approved by the agency.

  • Rationale: Allowing Teams integration with all Microsoft apps can expose the agency to potential vulnerabilities present in those apps. By only allowing specific apps and blocking all others, the agency will better manage its app integration and potential exposure points.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) policy, all custom policies, and the org-wide app settings. Custom policies MAY be created to allow more flexibility for specific users.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

MS.TEAMS.5.2v1 – Agencies SHOULD only allow installation of third-party apps approved by the agency.

  • Rationale: Allowing Teams integration with third-party apps can expose the agency to potential vulnerabilities present in an app not managed by the agency. By allowing only specific apps approved by the agency and blocking all others, the agency can limit its exposure to third-party app vulnerabilities.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) policy, all custom policies if they exist, and the org-wide settings. Custom policies MAY be created to allow more flexibility for specific users. Third-party apps are not available in GCC, GCC High, or DoD regions.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

MS.TEAMS.5.3v1 – Agencies SHOULD only allow installation of custom apps approved by the agency.

  • Rationale: Allowing custom apps integration can expose the agency to potential vulnerabilities present in an app not managed by the agency. By allowing only specific apps approved by the agency and blocking all others, the agency can limit its exposure to custom app vulnerabilities.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • Note: This policy applies to the Global (Org-wide default) policy, all custom policies if they exist, and the org-wide settings. Custom policies MAY be created to allow more flexibility for specific users. Custom apps are not available in GCC, GCC High, or DoD regions.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

Resources

 

License Requirements

 

  • N/A

Security Solutions

6. Data Loss Prevention

Data loss prevention (DLP) helps prevent both accidental leakage of sensitive information as well as intentional exfiltration of data. DLP forms an integral part of securing Microsoft Teams. There are several commercial DLP solutions available documenting support for M365. Microsoft itself offers DLP services, controlled within the Microsoft Purview compliance portal. Agencies may select any service that fits their needs and meets the requirements outlined in this baseline setting. The DLP solution selected by an agency should offer services comparable to those offered by Microsoft.

Though using Microsoft’s DLP solution is not strictly required, guidance for configuring Microsoft’s DLP solution can be found in following section of the CISA M365 Secure Configuration Baseline for Defender for Office 365.

Policies

 

MS.TEAMS.6.1v1 – A DLP solution SHALL be enabled. The selected DLP solution SHOULD offer services comparable to the native DLP solution offered by Microsoft.

MS.TEAMS.6.2v1 – The DLP solution SHALL protect personally identifiable information (PII) and sensitive information, as defined by the agency. At a minimum, sharing of credit card numbers, taxpayer identification numbers (TINs), and Social Security numbers (SSNs) via email SHALL be restricted.

  • Rationale: Teams users may inadvertently share sensitive information with others who should not have access to it. Data loss prevention policies provide a way for agencies to detect and prevent unauthorized sharing of sensitive information.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

Resources

 

License Requirements

 

Security Solutions

7. Malware Scanning

Malware scanning protects M365 Teams assets from malicious software. Several commercial anti-malware solutions detect and prevent computer viruses, malware, and other malicious software from being introduced into M365 Teams. Agencies may select any product that meets the requirements outlined in this baseline policy group. If the agency is using Microsoft Defender to implement malware scanning, see the following policies of the CISA M365 Secure Configuration Baseline for Defender for Office 365 for additional guidance.

Policies

 

MS.TEAMS.7.1v1 – Attachments included with Teams messages SHOULD be scanned for malware.

  • Rationale: Teams can be used as a mechanism for delivering malware. In many cases, malware can be detected through scanning, reducing the risk for end users.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

MS.TEAMS.7.2v1 – Users SHOULD be prevented from opening or downloading files detected as malware.

  • Rationale: Teams can be used as a mechanism for delivering malware. In many cases, malware can be detected through scanning, reducing the risk for end users.
  • Last modified: July 2023
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping:

Resources

 

License Requirements

 

  • If using Microsoft Defender, require Defender for Office 365 Plan 1 or 2. These are included with E5 and G5 and are available as add-ons for E3 and G3.

Security Solutions

Several technologies exist for protecting users from malicious links included in emails. For example, Microsoft Defender accomplishes this by prepending

https://*.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=

to any URLs included in emails. By prepending the safe links URL, Microsoft can proxy the initial URL through their scanning service. Their proxy can perform the following actions:

  • Compare the URL with a block list.

  • Compare the URL with a list of know malicious sites.

  • If the URL points to a downloadable file, apply real-time file scanning.

If all checks pass, the user is redirected to the original URL.

Microsoft Defender includes link-scanning capabilities. Using Microsoft Defender is not strictly required for this purpose; any product fulfilling the requirements outlined in this baseline policy group may be used. If the agency uses Microsoft Defender to meet this baseline policy group, see the following policy of the CISA M365 Secure Configuration Baseline for Defender for Office 365 for additional guidance.

Policies

 

MS.TEAMS.8.1v1 – URL comparison with a blocklist SHOULD be enabled.

MS.TEAMS.8.2v1 – User click tracking SHOULD be enabled.

Resources

 

License Requirements

 

  • N/A

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